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SECURITY INFORMATION

21 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT : Review of Policies Affecting the Clandestine Effort

1. In accordance with your instructions we have undertaken a review of national policies to determine the extent to which these policies required clarification or amendment in order to facilitate the clandestine effort. During this review, NSC, inter-departmental, internal agency, and international policies were subject to some degree of analysis. All functional and area divisions were given the opportunity to review our findings.

2. On balance, the general concensus among Staff and Divisions appears to prevail that in the main our national policy directives and guidances are fairly adequate to accomplish the CIA mission. A detailed analysis of national policies reveals that CIA has far broader policy authorization from the National Security Council than it has the capabilities to execute its responsibilities in the national psychological program, except under unusual circumstances.

3. Some operational elements do not believe an acute need exists for broad restatement of policies. It is their opinion that clarification of existing policies and interpretation of policy inevitably must continue to be sought on an ad hoc basis, inasmuch as policy matters cannot be valid for a long period. Some believe that useful and lasting policy statements could be enunciated concerning allocation of responsibilities among agencies. In many instances, however, it is quite obvious that two simultaneous approaches to an objective by different departments and agencies are bound to overlap with respect to specific responsibilities. One would hope in this instance that they parallel or converge, and I believe the fear exists that they might actually negate each other. This appears to be particularly true in the field of propaganda and, in some respects, economic warfare.

4. Some thinking

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4. Some thinking on this subject which should form a criterion for policy determination is as follows:

a. They should permit maximum utilization of the existing critical but favorable factors in a given situation. They should conversely mitigate the influence of adverse critical factors in a given situation.

b. They should lead to actions acceptable to both the U. S. and to the objective country, even though the motivations leading to the action may often be dissimilar.

c. U. S. statements of long-term policy toward a given country should not act as a roadblock to the attainment of short-term goals. (Example: U. S. advocacy of a permanently disarmed and pacific Japan made some years back has returned as a ghost to haunt our endeavors to build up Japanese security forces.)

d. U. S. short-term policies should lead to actions contributing toward the attainment of long-term objectives, but they need not be absolutely the same as long-term policies. (This requires that U. S. policy be developed to unfold in a consistent pattern. This requirement should likewise discourage the U. S. habit of ad hoc policy formation, a habit currently virulent in too many quarters.)

5. There are broad areas wherein national policies and objectives are not up-to-date nor too well defined, viz., a China policy, a Middle East policy, and an economic warfare policy. It must be acknowledged, however, that these are problems of major magnitude conditioned by the global situation. Within the existing policies with respect to these areas, however, there is sufficient latitude to permit some category of covert activity within our broad general mission.

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[redacted]

7. From three

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7. From three different sources the question was raised as to the degree and extent of violence which may prevail in covert undertakings as a policy question. This has to be resolved, in my opinion, based on the judgment and common sense of the operators within the context of their particular mission and objective. I should think that in raising this question with higher councils we would be putting up our own straw man. The degree of ruthlessness to be employed should be a matter of on-the-spot decision. The mission and objective should be the prime considerations and not the policy consideration. It would appear that this is a matter for internal determination under the NSC 10/2 mission. As a matter of SOP we should utilize to the fullest our own capacity to interpret policy without seeking formal external clearance.

8. Inasmuch as the review of policy requirements was comprehensive, certain desks and functional specialists were bound to raise issues which, on the surface, appear to be marginal or of a low priority category. We have lumped together these particular problems as a separate annex (Tab D) to assure completeness of the review, but have excluded them from the main compilation.

9. The paper should receive further review and a determination made as to what policies should receive immediate consideration and, perhaps, some priority listing of the others indicated. The most effective method would appear to be the appointment of a committee or staff (similar to the Murder Board). I have included explanatory tabs with the three principal NSC general policies which appear to be of universal concern.

25X1A [redacted]

Special Assistant
for Plans and Programs

Attachment:
Policy Review Paper, TS 82005/2

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